Why The Oslo Accords Fell Apart
The closest Israel and Palestine ever came to peace, where they went wrong, and what we can learn from the past - how remarkable it would have been.
Oslo I
The Oslo Accords were a set of agreements kicked off on September 13th, 1993 by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to initiate a path to peace between the two entities. The premise was to set up a Palestinian Authority as an interim government that would then establish itself as a permanent government over a hopefully recognized Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank within a five year period. Ideally, by 1999, the warring states would see peace. What unfolded was a story of failure, tragedy, and a murky promise for peace that, in hindsight, seemed to have never been a real possibility.
There is a large preamble to the Oslo Accords, including peace meetings in Madrid, U.S dynamics during the Bush administration, and why Norway was involved to begin with. For the sake of brevity, I’ll be jumping straight into September of 1993, when the first Oslo Agreement was signed.
As a show of good faith a week prior to their meeting, PLO Leader Yasser Arafat wrote to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin:
“The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security. The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process, and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations.”
In return, although perhaps not as immediately upfront in positivity as the letter above, Rabin wrote to Arafat:
“In response to your letter of September 9, 1993, I wish to confirm to you that, in light of the PLO commitments included in your letter, the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.”
In a sense, this very letter from Rabin highlights some of the primary faults of this first Oslo Accord. He recognized the PLO as the “representative of the Palestinian people”, however there was no recognition of a Palestinian state — or even worse, there was no plan for recognition of a Palestinian state in the accords themselves. I’ll cover this more in depth as the article continues, but something to keep in mind.
After nearly half a century of fighting, there was agreement on both sides to end the evil between the two. Within the Oslo Accords fell multiple other agreements that are crucial to understanding the bigger picture of the peace deal. This initial kickoff in 1993 became known as the Oslo I Accord, setting the tone for a dream that would never be realized. Here is the exact wording of the aim of negotiations — for those interested:
Oslo I was meant to be an interim agreement between the two. One qualm that many had with the initial agreement was how it failed to address primary issues: violence, land encroachment, equal rights, etc. But it was a start, and a start was better than nothing. Israel feared that the immediate recognition of a Palestinian state was premature. Palestine was split into three factions — the PLO, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad — and Israel believed that the lack of organization would pose danger. They agreed on interim steps to set up an organized body of authority that would hopefully not be undermined by Hamas or Islamic Jihad. Below are the exact interim agreements for those interest, however feel free to skip over them:
Gaza-Jericho
On May 4th of 1994, a few months after Oslo I, PLO Leader Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin signed the Gaza-Jericho agreement. Israel promised to vacate from the Jericho region in the West Bank and specific areas in Gaza within three weeks of signing. Perhaps the bigger outcome of the agreement was the creation of the Palestinian Authority, recognized by Israel as a credible representative of the Palestinian people, and led by Arafat himself. This was a step towards autonomy in Palestine, granting them governmental and democratic power, I’m including some examples below:
“Power to formulate policies, supervise their implementation, employ staff, establish departments, authorities and institutions, sue and be sued and conclude contracts.”
“Power, within its jurisdiction, to promulgate legislation, including basic laws, laws, regulations and other legislative acts.”
Here is the official agreement
This came to be known as the 1994 Cairo Agreement, a massive milestone for Palestine.
The less exciting but still important portion of Gaza-Jericho was the Protocol on Economic Relations, which was signed just a few days prior and become known as the Paris Protocol. It set up a tax system where Israel would collect import taxes on goods that pertained to Palestinian territories, and transfer those taxes to Palestinian authorities. This still has implications today.
Oslo II
Then came Oslo II. This was another interim agreement that attempted to implement a step wise approach toward achieving peace. Oslo II created three factions in the West Bank, areas A, B, and C.
Area A comprised 3% of the West Bank with plans to grow that up to 18% in 1999. Area A was meant to be fully controlled by Palestinians.
Area B consisted roughly 25% of the region but housed almost 70% of Palestinians at the time. Here, Palestine would have civil control, but Israel and Palestine would have joint security control, with the Israeli military overriding much of the Palestinian Council’s order. This would grow to be contentious later on.
Area C was most of the rest of the West Bank, between 70%-75%, where Israelis would have full control. Roughly 13% of Area C was to be transitioned under Area B by 1999 as per a future agreement.
The idea behind these land delegations was to have portions of each area — A, B, and C — be reallocated over time so as to give Palestinians more control. By the end of 1999, Palestine was to have just shy of 20% control over the West Bank, with another roughly 35% of livable land with joint Israeli and Palestinian security control. Oslo II was officially signed in September of 1995.
Terrorism, Conflict, and Assassination
Agreements were not being enacted as swiftly as they were planned, however, they were stable. Instability came quick in 1994 as a series of events increased friction between Israel and Palestine.
In February of 1994, in between Oslo I and Oslo II, an American-Israeli extremist brought an assault rifle into the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron and opened fire on Muslims. Baruch Goldstein killed 29 Palestinians who were praying in the mosque, one as young as 12 years old, and he injured 125. This became known as the Hebron Massacre of 1994. Ensuing mass protests in the West Bank by Palestinians led to several other deaths, mostly Palestinians and some Israelis. The slaughter was only a handful of months after Oslo I, and increased tensions and doubt on whether the peace deal could be achieved. The PLO continued its efforts, alongside Israel, to get the peace deal across the finish line.
In April of 1994, as some form of retaliation to the Hebron Massacre, Hamas began a series of terrorist attacks. Over the next 12 months, Hamas and Islamic Jihad would launch a sequence of seven bombings, both suicide and from afar, that killed over 60 Israelis.
The fact that Oslo II would still go on to happen was wildly commendable on both ends — Israeli and Palestinian. The PLO and Israeli Government seemed to really envision a more prosperous future, Prime Minister Rabin was a massive advocate for peace, and the PLO condemned the actions of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The two recognized parties were on somewhat similar pages. There is still a lot to be learned from these efforts towards peace proceedings.
Then, the unimaginable happened.
In November of 1995, two months after Oslo II, Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by a far right Israeli extremist Yigal Amir. Amir was sternly against the Oslo Accords, and murdered Rabin in an attempt to kill the Oslo deals. This has perhaps been the single most impactful death in Israeli history over the last seven decades. Rabin was an immense advocate for peace between Israel and Palestine. He won the Nobel Peace prize in 1994, alongside his Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and PA Leader Arafat. His assassination would have great implications to come.
The opposition to Prime Minister Rabin was very loud. Far-right Israelis did not want peace. They did not want to deal with the PLO as they couldn’t keep other factions like Hamas and Islamic Jihad at bay. They protested often. They flaunted posters of Rabin dressed as an SS officer. They demonized him. And that ultimately led to his death.
Doctored image of Yitzhak Rabin in Nazi uniform
He was the Israelis’ biggest hope at achieving a prosperous two-state solution. That fateful day in November, Rabin held a peace rally with over 100,000 demonstrators. He was shot and killed as he was getting in his car; with him died hope. May he rest in peace.
Peres took over as standing minister, still looking to broker the peace deal between Israel and Palestine as reasonably as possible.
In January of 1996, the Israeli Shin Bet assassinated Yahya Ayyash, the chief bomb maker for Hamas, who was not yet in power at the time. After Rabin’s assassination, the Palestinian Authority had strengthened its ties with the Shin Bet to find Ayyash in a demonstration to bring Hamas down and to fortify their relationship with the Israeli government.
In February and March of 1996, Hamas responded with four terrorist suicide bombings, killing 78 Israelis. The first of these was the Jaffa Road bus bombings in Jerusalem. The Palestinian President, Arafat, condemned these bombings as a terrorist operation and was worried they would pose a threat to Oslo I. Standing Prime Minister Peres said he was determined to fight Hamas, but would not give up on a prosperous and peaceful future between Israelis and Palestinians. Peres suspended contacts with the Palestinian Authority and sealed off Gaza and the West Bank, disallowing 60,000 Palestinian workers from entering Israel for work. The bus bombings signaled to Israel that the Palestinian Authority had little control over other organizations that resided in Gaza and the West Bank, furthering tensions in the Oslo deal.
In May of 1996, Prime Minister elections were held in Israel, which resulted in a win for Benjamin Netanyahu with a margin of less than one percent. Peres had been winning in the polls several months before by a substantial margin, but the Hamas terrorist attacks brought an amplified voice to Netanyahu. It diverted the people from peace. Peace deals were noticeably slowing at this point, despite Netanyahu’s supposed commitment to see them through.
Wye River Memorandum
In October of 1998, Netanyahu and Arafat met in Maryland to settle the Wye River Memorandum, which looked to continue the implementation of Oslo II. It reassured that over the next month, 2% of Area C was to be transferred to Area B, and 7.1% of Area B was to be transferred to Area A (Stage 1). Then in December, 5% of Area C was to be transferred under Area B (Stage 2). Lastly, in January of 1999, 5% from Area C was to go to Area B; 1% from Area C to Area A, and 7.1% from Area B to Area A (Stage 3).
Confusing, I know.
Unfortunately, when December of 1998 rolled around, Israel had only withdrawn from 2% of Area C instead of the agreed upon 13%. A group of extremists in the Knesset, Israel’s legislative body, also threatened a vote of no confidence against Netanyahu if the agreement went through. There were other agreements that both sides accused the other of not completing, and hope for peace started to deteriorate rapidly. Netanyahu was still called on for a vote of no confidence, which succeeded, and the next election cycle began early.
Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum
In the Israeli election of 1999, Ehud Barak defeated Netanyahu. On September 28th of 1999, Barak and Arafat signed the Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum, which once again redefined regions A, B, and C in an attempt to continue the Oslo II momentum. There were provisions to transfer portions of Area C to Area B, Area B to Area A, and Area C to Area A. The memorandum was signed and implementation was set to begin immediately. Then the last straw broke.
Temple Mount — The Last Straw
On September 28th of 2000, almost exactly one year after the Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum, Ariel Sharon — Israel’s opposition leader — visited the Temple Mount, one of the holiest sites in all of Islam. It was a provocative visit to the Palestinians, with a nudging implication from Sharon that the Temple Mount would remain under Israeli sovereignty regardless of any Oslo Accord or peace treaty. This reassurance was silly because the Oslo Accords never stated that Israel would hand over sovereignty of the Temple Mount. The Israeli government granted Sharon permission so as to not appear weak in the hands of the taunting opposition within their own state.
This came with further implications as just ten days before the visit, Palestinians had remembered the Sabra and Shatila massacre, which had led to the death of hundreds if not thousands of civilians. Ariel Sharon had been the Israeli Defense Minister during that time, and had been blamed for negligence in the protection of civilians. His visit to the Al-Aqsa mosque did not sit well with Palestinians. It was seen as a sign of disrespect and disregard for any compromise in a peace treaty standing on its last legs.
The very next day, on September 29th of 2000, Palestinian riots broke out in the Old City of Jerusalem, marking the start of the Second Intifada.
And just like that, peace accords came to an end. That’s where this story concludes.
Reflections, Learnings, and Longing
It’s hard to reconcile fault or blame in a situation drowned with blood and tears, day by day watching hope slip through the knuckles of those who dreamt for better — those who deserved better.
Palestinians dreamt of a state, but that was seemingly never in the cards. From Rabin’s initial letter to Arafat, a Palestinian state was never recognized, it was never in any plan to eventually be recognized, and it was perhaps what the Palestinians longed for most. They wanted their homes back, they wanted their temples back, and they wanted to be treated with the dignity and respect that all citizens of their own nations should have and are entitled to. Palestinians, I suppose, thought that the stoppage of Israeli settler encroachment was a given despite not being explicitly stated in the accords. The Israeli settler population in the West Bank had increased from 100,000 to 192,000 between the early 1990s and the late 1990s while the Oslo Accords were ongoing. The transfer of land that was promised time and time again between all memorandums was unkept at best and further encroached on at worst. Nearly 2,000 Palestinian homes were destroyed throughout the decade of Oslo, Palestinian civilians surely did not feel heard nor respected.
Israelis dreamt of peace, which PLO leaders were ultimately unable to bring to them. Other groups fighting for power within Palestine itself, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, constantly terrorized Israeli people throughout the decade of the 1990s. Each terrorist attack further ingrained Israel’s belief that handing over land would be a mistake, weakening their state. Hamas and Islamic Jihad conducted dozens of terrorist attacks on Israelis between 1993 and 2000, with at least 16 of those attacks being mass bombings. They were tragedies that pulled back any hope of Oslo with each occurrence.
But I think there’s still a lot to be learned from the failures, and perhaps even short-lived successes, of the Oslo Accords. That golden period of 1993 to 1995, where hope for peace between Israel and Palestine was stronger than it had ever been, showed us that peace can only be achieved through forgiveness. That at any given moment, there may be bombings, and theft, and injustice — but if righteousness and peace come from the top down, then the only path to a prosperous future is to be such a forgiving leader that you will be willing to make amends with the party that hurt you — and that has to go both ways. While I do not have a crystal ball, achieving a peace deal in 1995 with amendments that reasonably accommodated the wants of both sides would have almost certainly left us in a better situation now than the current nightmare we are living in. For that to become reality, both sides need to come to the table, and listen attentively to the requests of the other, keeping their own civilians’ well-being, safety, and prosperity at the top of their mind. Perhaps you rolled your eyes, perhaps that is obvious to the point of naiveté, but the point here is that it happened. It happened when two leaders sat down with each other; that, at the very least, gives me some hope.
I hope you’re doing well in these times, my heart goes out to all those who have been affected by the tragedies. Thanks for reading.